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NOTES
rough balance between the interests of disabled parties and the interests of
the living. From a reading of the cases involving the "Dead Man" statute it
is difficult to decide if it has worked any great hardship. When the statute
is invoked the testimony is barred and one cannot tell what might have been
the result had the testimony been admitted. However, regardless of any
possible hardship, it is felt that the statute should be examined to see if it
has outlived its purpose.8 7 It was not enacted to protect a confidential rela-
tion, but was enacted to prevent fraud and unjust claims. At the present
time, with the wide scope of cross-examination allowed, it is probable that
a just result may be reached by allowing the unprotected party to testify and
permitting the jury to decide the weight it will give to this testimony. 8
The legislature though protecting the estates of disabled parties must also
protect the living and the interests of justice.
ERNEST K. CHARVAT
JOSEPH M HOLDEN
Annulment Problems in Ohio
WHEN THE courts of Ohio are called upon to annul a marriage or de-
termine the effect of the relations of the parties to an apparent marriage,
the question often arises as to whether such marriage was valid, voidable or
void. Whether the circumstances which make an annulment possible ren-
der a marriage void or only voidable is decisive m determimng who may
question its validity,' when the issue may be raised,2 and what rights attach
to the relationship.
The general equitable powers granted to the common pleas courts of
Ohio form the basis of their jurisdiction over annulment of marriages . The
existence and effect of the various grounds for annulment depend entirely
upon judicial pronouncements, there being no statutes on annulment in
Ohio.
At early common law, the existence of a civil disability, which went to
the intention and consent to enter into such a contract, made a marriage
1
"The general rule as to estoppel arising from the marriage relation is that where a
marriage is shown to be void, neither of the parties nor his or her representatives
can, by any acts, be estopped from denying the voidness of the marriage, especially
if neither believed a valid marriage to exist." 35 AM. JuR. 213.
'A void marriage may be attacked either before or after the person alleged incom-
petent dies. Heath v. Heath, 25 Obio N.P. (N.S.) 123 (1924). A voidable one
may not Heyse v. Michalske, 31 Ohio L Abs. 484 (1940).
,Omio GEN. CODE § 11215. Madden v. Shallenberger, 121 Ohio St. 401, 169 N.E.
450 (1929); Waymire v. Jetmore, 22 Obio St. 271 (1872); Clowry v. Clowry, 16
Ohio C. C. 302 (1898); Vernon v. Vernon, 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 365 (1884).
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void.4 The existence of a canonical disability, such as physical incapacity,
consanguinity or affinity, made it voidable.5 Since then, for reasons of
public policy, the demarcation has been relaxed, so that no present general
classification or definition distinguishing void and and voidable marriages is
entirely satisfactory. 6
Courts in Ohio have held that marriage in which one of the parties has
a prior living spouse is void,7 as is a marriage between an uncle and a mece,a
a marriage of a mental incompetent,' one in which the consent of one of
the parties was obtained under duress,'0 and one in which the parties knew
there was no intention to keep the promises." On the other hand, a proxy
marriage without cohabitation, 12 a marriage between first cousins,'3 one
procured by fraud,' 4 and one in which a party is physically incapable of
fulfilling the marital duties' 5 have been held to be voidable.
'MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 7 (1931).
'State v. Moore, 1 Ohio Dec. Repr. 171 (1845); 26 OHIO JUt. 46.
"'A marriage may be considered voidable although prohibited by law when it is
possible, under any circumstances, for the parties to contract the marriage, and sub-
sequently to ratify it, while it should be considered void if it is impossible for them
subsequently by any conduct to ratify it, and if the statute expressly declares that the
marriage is void." 35 AM. JUR. 212; Approved in Heyse v. Michalske, 31 Ohio
L Abs. 484 (1940).
TWilliams v. Williams, 90 Ohio App. 369, 106 N.E.2d 655 (1951); State v.
Moore, 1 Ohio Dec. Repr. 171 (1845); Briscoe v. Reed, 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 360
(1883) where defendant's prior wife made it possible for plaintiff to institute
bastardy proceedings, as an unmarried woman.
In Kennelly v. Cowle, 4 Ohio N.P. 105 (1897) the wife was held not entitled
to dower where the husband had a prior living wife. Fultz v. Fultz, 9 Ohio N.P.
(N. S.) 593 (1910); Falkoff v. Sugarman, 26 Ohio N.P. (N. S.) 81 (1925).
Cf. Smith v. Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (1855).
In Brenholtz v. Brenholtz, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (1935), a separation agree-
ment incorporated in a divorce decree, whereby the husband agreed to pay a stipu-
lated sum monthly to the wife during her life or until she remarried, was held en-
forceable after the annulment of a marriage entered into by the wife with a third
person who had a wife living and undivorced at the time.
In Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943), the plaintiff
was not estopped from a divorce by principles of "dean hands" because he knew of
the invalidity of the defendant's Mexican divorce. Blaustein v. Blaustein, 77 Ohio
App. 281, 66 N.E.2d 156 (1946) Crane v. Ward, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 98 (1926).
'Heyse v. Michalske, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 484 (1940).
'Waymire v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271 (1872); Goodheart v. Spear, 18 Ohio C. C.
679 (1893); Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 123 (1924). However, if
the marriage was celebrated in another state, where it was valid, the Ohio courts will
not avoid it. Seabold v. Seabold, 84 Ohio App. 83, 84 N.E.2d 521 (1948).
"Smith v. Smith, 47 Week. L. Bull. [Ohio] 137 (1902).
'Conley v. Conley, 28 Ohio Op. 289 (1943).
It has also been recognized generally that a qualified consent gives rise to no
marriage. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 8 (1931).
" Respole v. Respole, 34 Ohio Op. 1, 70 N.E.2d 465 (1946).
"Walker v. Walker, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 84 N.E.2d 258 (1948)
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Ohio cases have held that a marriage in which one of the parties has a
prior living spouse may be "ratified" by continued cohabitation after're-
moval of the disability.'8 This would seem to be in contradiction to the
general concept of a void marriage. From the reasoning of these cases,
however, it would seem that such "ratification!' is not a retroactive affirming
of the original contract but rather the creation of a common law marriage by
an implication of the contAnuance of the original matrimonial promise
= praesewt. Thus, it is the creation of a new relationship and not the
affirmance. of an old one.
It has been held in Ohio that the existence of a prior living spouse as
a ground for divorce' has not changed the rule that a marriage contracted
by one with a prior living spouse is void.' A recent Ohio Supreme Court
decision,'9 however, has held that in such a situation a divorce action, not
an annulment action, is a proper proceeding.
Misapplication of the term "ratification" has resulted in confusion in
determining whether the marriage of one under the statutory age of con-
sent,20 but above the common law age of consent,2' is void or voidable.
The weight of authority in the United States construes such a marriage
'Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Repr. 561, af'd, 7 Ohio Dec. Repr. 627 (1878);
Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 354 (1900).
Generally, mistake as to the nature and legal consequences of the ceremony, or
as to the identity of the other party, also renders a marriage voidable. MADDEN,
DOMESIc RELATmONs 9 (1931).
' McDowell v. Sapp, 39 Ohio St. 558 (1883).
"Johnson v. Wolford, 117 Ohio St. 136, 157 N.E. 385 (1927); Hale v. Graham, 85
Ohio App. 447, 86 N.E.2d 330 (1948); Ryan v. Ryan, 84 Ohio App. 139, 86
N.E.2d 44 (1948); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 Ohio App. 336, 164 N.E. 790 (1928);
Johnson v. Dudley, 3 Ohio N.P. 196 (1896). But cf. Lumas v. Lumas, 26 Ohio
App. 502, 160 N.E. 480 (1927), cert. denmd, 25 Ohio L. Rep. 638 (1927).
Such ratification plus acknowledgement of a child legitimates that child regard-
less of its date of birth. Ono GEN. CODE § 10503-15; Ives v. McNicoll, 59 Ohio
St. 402, 53 N.E. 60 (1898); Wright v. Lore, 12 Ohio St. 619 (1861); Clinton
County Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Wilmington v. Todhunter, 43 Ohio App. 289,
183 N.E. 88 (1931).
17Omo GEN. CODE § 8003-1(1).
"Williams v. Williams, 90 Ohio App. 369, 106 NB.2d 655 (1951); State v.
Moore, 1 Ohio Dec. Repr. 171 (1845).
The purpose generally attributed to the inclusion of this ground in Ohio Gen-
eral Code Sec. 8003-1 was to permit the judicial determination and removal from
the marriage records of the record of a marriage contract between parties who are
not bound thereby. Smith v. Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (1855); Kennelly v. Cowle,
4 Ohio N.P. 105 (1897); Basile v. Basile, 86 Ohio App. 535, 93 N.E.2d 564
(1948).
"Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
"OHIO GEN. CODE § 8001-1 (eighteen years for males and sixteen years for fe-
males.)
" MADDEN, DOME.TC RELATIONS 28 (1931) (fourteen years for males and twelve
years for females.)
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to be merely voidable.22 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Shafher v. State,23
held a marriage by a male under eighteen years of age to be void, although
he could ratify it after reaching that age. In that case, Shafher appealed a
conviction for bigamy. He had married one woman when he was sixteen.
After leaving her, he cohabited with a second woman, whom he married
after reaching eighteen. The court said that the first marriage was void
and remained so unless acts of assent by him after reaching eighteen could
be shown.2 4  The court based its holding upon the old English view of
nonage as a civil disability, which rendered the marriage void.25
Later, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the marriage of a girl of fifteen
became "irrevocable" upon ratification after reaching sixteen.20  She had
ratified solely by writing letters to her spouse, addressing him as her hus-
band, and signing them by her Christian and his surname. Since the only
evidence of ratification in the case was these letters, the court seemed to
treat the marriage as voidable, rather than void, by holding that the hus-
band might sue for alienation of affections. The court held that the par-
ents of the girl could not entice her away from her husband merely be-
cause she was under age and had married without their consent.
Since then, cases in the lower courts have reiterated the doctrine of
Shafher v. State.27 However, in those cases the marriages had been ratified
by cohabitation after the statutory age of consent was reached.
Then, in Courtrtght v. Courtrght,2s a lower court expressly held, in a
decision which was affirmed without opimon by the Supreme Court of
2MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 28 (1931).
"20 Ohio 1 (1851)
The court also stated that if the first marriage were said to bind him unless he
dissented therefrom after reaching the age of eighteen, the acts of Shafher were
sufficient to constitute such dissent.
' It reasoned that unless such marriages were declared absolutely void youths would
be irrevocably bound to a marriage in which advantage had been taken of their
immaturity, the law furnishing no method of obtaining an annulment. Shafher v.
State, 20 Ohio 1, 7 (1851).
'Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884).
"Gill v. Gill, 2 Ohio L Abs. 14 (1923); lo re Zemmick's Estate, 49 Ohlo L. Abs.
353, 76 N.E.2d 902 (1946); Ott v. Ott, 3 Ohio N.P. 161 (1893), the marriage is
void to the extent that the party under age may ignore it without judiaal annulment
or decree of divorce, and may marry again without bigamy; Vernon v. Vernon, 9
Ohio Dec. Repr. 365 (1884); Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 123 (1924);
State v. Wilcox, 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 343 (1926); Pearlman v. Pearlman, 27 Ohio
N.P.(N.S.) 46 (1928); Carlton v. Carlton, 76 Ohio App. 338, 64 N.E.2d 428
(1945)
In Moser v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 10 (1916), the court went so far as to hold
the marriage of a seventeen year old girl voidable where there was no cohabitation
and a prompt repudiation, on the theory that the statute requiring parental consent
was more than a directive statute. This idea has since been repudiated. Allen v.
Allen, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 313 (1923); Pearlman v. Pearlman, 27 Ohio N.P.(N.S.)
46 (1928).
[September
NOTES
Ohio, 29 that the marriage of a girl of fifteen was voidable, not void. It
stated that:
The statutes of this state provide, that a female may enter into the
marriage relation upon arriving at the age of sixteen years, but do not de-
dare that a marriage by her under that age is void. Hence, where a fe-
male over the common law age of twelve years, though under the statutory
age of sixteen years, enters into the marriage relation in this state, while
such marriage would be voidable at the election of the infant, it is by no
means void so
By this decision the husband was held entitled to his share of the wife's
estate although she died before reaching the age of sixteen.
Two notable cases, Klinebell v. HiltorpL and Peefer v. State,32 have fol-
lowed the Courtrtght case. In Klinebell v. Hilton, the common pleas court
declared that the parents of a fourteen year old girl had no right to have
the marriage annulled contrary to her wishes, for the power to avoid such a
marriage lay only in the parties themselves. In Peefer v. State, a court of
appeals likewise held such a marriage to be voidable solely at the option of
the minor. Here the defendaoit, a forty year old man, had married a girl of
fourteen in Kentucky. After they returned to Ohio, the defendant was
indicted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.33 The court said
that there could be no conviction unless it was determined that she was a
delinquent. The court reasoned that she was not a delinquent unless she
violated an Ohio law,34 which she did not do unless the Ohio law makes
the marriage void and not just voidable at her opnon. 3 5 By this decision,
the court inferentially nullified an earlier case 6 in which a defendant in
similar circumstances was convicted on the authority of Shafher v. State.
At least a part of the confusion is due to the fact that those Ohio cases
which hold the nonage marriages voidable ignore the cases in Ohio which
' 11 Ohio Dec. Repr. 413 (1887).
' Courtright v. Courtright, 53 Ohio St. 685 44 NY 1134 (1895).
ii11 Ohio Dec. Repr. 413 (1887).
'25 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 167 (1924).
3i42 Ohio App. 276, 182 N.E. 116 (1931).
1 Omo GEN. CODE § 1639-45 which at that time was OHIO GEN. CODE § 1654.
' Since this case, the definition of a delinquent child, OHIO GEN. CODE § 1639-2,
was amended so that now a delinquent child includes any child, "5. who attempts to
enter the marriage relation in this or any other state without the consent of its par-
ents, custodian, legal guardian or other legal authority, as required by the laws of
this state." There have been no reported cases found which mentioned this amend-
meat as effecting the validity of such a marriage.
'The law of the state in which a marriage is celebrated, is the law that governs the
capacity of the parties to enter into the contract .of marriage and the validity of a
marriage of persons domiciled in this state, except when the statutes of this state
declare such marriage void or when its celebration offends a strong public policy
of this state. Seabold v. Seabold, 84 Ohio App. 83, 84 N.E.2d 521 (1948).
"
0State v. Wilcox, 26 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 343 (1926).
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hold the marriages completely void, while the latter ignore the former. In
recent decisions, a fifteen year old boy has been denied an annulment be-
cause of a prospective offspring,37 while a seventeen year old boy has been
granted an annulment where there was a child.38
The courts of Ohio have held that where the relation of the parties,
through consanguinity or affinity, is close enough to fall within the Ohio
criminal incest statute,39 that is, where they are closer than first cousins,
the marriage is void ab tutmo.40  However, when first cousins marry in
violation of the marriage statute,41 the marriage is voidable only, although
one of the parties may be denied an annulment because of the equitable
doctrine of clean hands.42
The general rule is that the right to alimony attaches only to a valid
marriage.43 As to alimony pendente lite, the situation is somewhat different.
The statutory provision for alimony pendente lite4 was enacted to assist
the wife in her action for divorce or separate maintenance.45 Such tempo-
rary award may be granted even though at the final hearing the court may
find in fact that no valid marriage existed. If the evidence, presented at
the hearing for temporary alimony, as to the invalidity of the marriage is
'Broadus v. Lear, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 336 (1935) held the marriage voidable in con-
tradiction to the Shafher case because of the importance of the public policy against
allowing the birth of illegitimate children. But see OHIo GEN. CODE § 10503-15.
'Carlton v. Carlton, 76 Ohio App. 338, 64 N.E.2d 428 (1945). The plaintiff
lived with his wife only one month.
'OHio GEiN. CODE § 13023.
*°Heyse v. Michalske, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 484 (1940), here an uncle and niece married.
41 OHiO GEN. CODE § 8001-1, "Who may contract matrimony. Male persons of
the age of eighteen years, and female persons of the age of sixteen years, not nearer
of kin than second cousins
"Walker v. Walker, 54 Ohio L Abs. 153, 155-156, 84 N.E.2d 258, 259-260
(1948) citing Lamneck, OHio DivoRcE AND ALiMONY 200 (1948). The mar-
riage of first cousins is valid in Ohio if valid where made. Slovenian Mutual Bene-
fit Assn. v. Knafelj, 36 Ohio App. 562, 173 N.E. 630 (1930). No action can be
maintained for breach of contract of marriage where the parties were first cousins.
Reed v. Reed, 49 Ohio St. 654, 32 N.E. 750 (1892).
"35 AM. JuR. 227; accord Short v. Short, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 49, 102 N.E.2d 719
(1951).
But it is to be noted that where an action for divorce is brought on the ground
that one of the parties had a spouse living at the time of the marriage alimony may
be granted. OHIo GEN. CODE § 8003-1; Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422,
103 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Vanvalley v. Vanvalley, 19 Ohio St. 588 (1869)
Omio GEN. CODE § 8003-15.
"Smith v. Smith, 37 Ohio L. Abs. 468, 48 NE.2d 661 (1942).
It would seem fairly dear from the position of the section allowing alimony
petdetae lite, within the chapter on divorce and alimony actions, and the wording
of the section itself, that it was not designed to cover actions for annulment. How-
ever, it would seem that some such allowance ought to be made in cases where a
party is required to defend an action for annulment. That the statute should apply
in such cases, see Smith v. Smith, supra at 469, 48 N.E.2d at 661.
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controverted, the court may in its discretion grant an award of alimony pen-
dente lite if it believes that the plaintiff has a fair prospect of success in her
action for divorce or separate maintenance."8 The court, however, is with-
out legal discretion to make an award where at the hearing for temporary
alimony it is admitted that the marriage relied upon was not a valid mar-
riage.47
SUMMARY
The law in Ohio seems to be that the marriage of one who has a prior
living spouse is void. s However, if after the death of that spouse or a
divorce from him, the parties continue to cohabit, the previously void
marriage may be "ratified. ' 4
9
In the case of a marriage by a person who is under the statutory age
of consent but over the common law age, the law appears uncertain.
Whether such a marriage is void as under the doctrine of the Shafher case °
or merely voidable as was held in the Courtoght case51 is a question still
open for final judicial determination.
Where the marriage of two parties is in violation of the Ohio incest
statute, the marriage is dearly void 2 On the other hand, if the marriage
contravenes the marriage statute alone, it is voidable.
5 3
In an action for divorce or separate maintenance, alimony pendente lite
may be awarded to a party, the validity of whose marriage is in issue, if the
court acting in its discretion finds from the evidence presented in the hear-
mg for temporary alimony that there is a reasonable likelihood that a valid
marriage exists.54
RicHRD P. NELSON
'Wilson v. Wilson, 45 Ohio L Abs. 494, 68 N.E.2d 149 (1945).
"'In Wolfer v. Wolfer, 19 Ohio App. 12, 14 (1923), it was stated" the court
is not required to go into the merits of the cause to allow alimony pendente lite and
expenses necessary to prosecute the sut, but a valid marriage is a prerequisite to an
allowance of alimony." Fultz v. Fultz, 9 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 593 (1910).
"See note 7 supra.
"See note 16 supra.
'20 Ohio 1 (1851).
"53 Ohio St. 685, 44 N.E. 1134 (1895).
"See notes 39, 40 supra.
SSee notes 41, 42 supra.
" See notes 46, 47 supra.
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